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Abstract 
A cold wind has blown down from the Northeast, casting a chill on the study of language 
acquisition: In research driven by adult linguistic theory and, in particular, the linguistic 
theories of MIT, it is a device that acquires a language, not a child, and language is separate 
from the rest of cognition and human development. The purpose of my presentation will be to 
'put the child back into the study of language acquisition' by showing how language is 
integrated with other behaviors as the development of language connects with other aspects of 
children's development. I begin with a brief review of how the focus shifted from a child to a 
device in the last generation of language acquisition research and theory. I then present a 
developmental model of language acquisition based on the young child's intentionality (Bloom, 
1993a, 1997, Bloom & Beckwith, 1987) and use the model to interpret results from some 
current research. The research findings show how children's language connects with their 
affective, social, and other cognitive behaviors--both in the real time of everyday events and 
the developmental time encompassed by the 2nd year of life. The conclusions are that language 
is not special and is not separate from the rest of a child's life and development. Therefore, 
theories of language acquisition that do not consider the larger developmental context in which 
language develops cannot be truly explanatory. 
CITATION:  Bloom, L. (1997). Putting the child (back) into the study of language acquisition.  Address on 
Receiving the G. Stanley Hall Award for Distinguished Contribution to Developmental Psychology from the 
American Psychological Association, Division 7, Chicago. 
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I spent the middle years of the 1960s doing the research for a doctoral dissertation on the 
importance of context and meaning for language acquisition. At one point, as an advanced 
graduate student, I was invited to present my findings to a faculty seminar at Columbia. They 
were a distinguished group of men--philosophers, linguists, psychologists--and they listened 
politely, smiling occasionally, as I enthusiastically told them about meaning in children's 
language. When I finished, I was asked, somewhat incredulously and not a little 
condescendingly, how could I ever hope to say anything about the meanings of children's early 
speech when: "half the time we don't even know what adults mean by what they say!" With 
my back to the wall, I patiently argued my case for studying meaning. I don't know if  I won 
many converts in that room, but soon after my thesis was published (Bloom, 1970), it went up 
like the proverbial Roman candle. Meaning, was suddenly a hot_topic in child language 
research--after having been virtually ignored in the generations before. 
Nowadays, the importance of meaning for language acquisition is taken for granted--a part of  
the Zeitgeist that no one seriously disputes. However, meaning enters into explanations of  
children's language in different ways, according to different acquisition theories. In 
psychologically driven theories, meaning in language is intimately related to developments in 
cognition and conceptual structure--most simply, meaning comes from what a child knows 
about people, objects, and events in the world. However, it is safe to say (and also sad to say) 
that the psychological and functionalist views are not the ascendant views in language 
acquisition research today. 
Instead, handed down from MIT has come what is, arguably, the most influential linguistic 
theory of  all time. Built into the original theory and its descendent theories since Chomsky 
(1965) are two things: first, a child--or, more accurately, a genetically determined "language 
acquisition device," which Chomsky once called "an organ of the mind"--and, second, the 
explicit goal of explaining how that device goes about its task of acquiring the adult language. 
Meaning in language is an aspect of a theory of grammar and built into specifically linguistic 
constraints or biases that purportedly guide a child's language acquisition). Many 
psychologists have since scrambled to test the theories that the philosophers and linguists of  
MIT propose for explaining language acquisition. But in the world according to MIT, it is a 
device that acquires language, not a child--and certainly not a child with feelings and thoughts 
about other persons, a child engaged in dynamic real-life events, a child learning to think 
about a world of  changing physical and psychological relationships, and, most importantly, a 
child poised to act, to influence, to gain control--in short, a child reaching out and embracing 
the learning of  language for the power of expression in provides. Instead, in the world 
according to MIT, the study of language acquisition is disembodied and decontextualized. 
The perspective from linguistic theory is that certain basic principles and parameters for 
acquiring a language are already built into the brain at birth--they are required by the language 
acquisition device to account for those aspects of grammar common to all the world's 
languages. In linguistically motivated research, children's early behaviors fit the abstract 
vagaries of the linguistic rules that are prescribed by the theory for generating sentences, not 
the language behaviors available to the child in the input. 
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In contrast, the psychological perspective is based on the assumption that language 
development depends on the mutual influence among many aspects of development--that it is a 
child, not a device, that acquires a language. Children converge on the forms and functions of 
adult language behaviors from the beginning--although they may deviate from them in 
systematic ways. I'll cite two examples of the tension between these two, very different views 
of how a child acquires a language: children's early sentences without sentence-subjects and 
the acquisition of negation. I use these examples, in particular, because the theoretical issues 
surrounding them were first introduced in my earliest research (Bloom, 1970), and both 
examples continue to be actively studied and debated today (although not by me), in efforts to 
support or refute one or another theoretical perspective on language acquisition. 
Subjectless Sentences 
Sentence subjects are required in a grammar of English, but the early sentences of children 
learning English very often occur without them, for example, little sentences like "read book," 
"ride train," and "no fit." Even after a child begins to say sentences with subjects, like "man 
making muffins" and "this go there," sentences without subjects continue to occur. In 
linguistic theory, whether sentences have subjects or not is a "parameter" in the universal 
grammar and built into the language acquisition device. The sentence-subjects parameter is 
not set at birth but gets turned 'on' or 'off' as a result of encounters with relevant exemplars in 
the input, according to whether sentence-subjects happen to be required or not in a particular 
language. The linguistic explanation of sentences wit4out subjects is that they are the early 
behavioral manifestation of an innate parameter of universal grammar in the language 
acquisition device, waiting to be switched on. (e.g., Hyams, 1986.) 
However, as this audience might have guessed, there are several psychological, 
developmentally based explanations of why young children might frequently leave out the 
subject of a sentence--explanations that build on the basic observation that very young children 
are limited in the amount of information they can handle at one time. The explanation I 
originally offered in 1970 has recently been confirmed in a number of studies by others--each 
of which, of course, putting a different spin on it (e.g., P. Bloom, 1990; Bosler, 1997; Boyle 
& Gerken,1997). But the basic theory is that what children can say depends on what they 
know about the language, but what they know about the language interacts with their other 
processing abilities and capacities to influence what they do say. 
For example, among other things, recalling words that are newly learned and so less automatic 
than well-known words, or adding negation or some other complexity to a sentence, or having 
to meet certain conversational demands compete for the young child's essentially limited 
resources, and something has to give. Thus, sentences with negation are shorter than 
affirmative sentences and lack sentence subjects initially, because negation in a sentence 'costs' 
the child extra cognitive effort. But the converse is also true: Sentence subjects are facilitated 
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and more likely to occur when, for example, children use words they know relatively well and 
can recall more easily, and do not add syntactic complexity (Bloom, Miller, & Hood, 1975). 
Thus, early sentences are systematically influenced by a variety of factors that increase or 
decrease the probability that a sentence will be complete or not. In short, subjectless sentences 
result from more general cognitive factors rather than from specifically linguistic factors--they 
are not the manifestation of a parameter in a language acquisition device that gets 'turned on' 
or not. 
Acquisition of  Negation 
Early negative sentences lack sentence subjects and typically begin with "no," for example, 
"no fit," and this observation continues to be invoked in theory and research to argue for 
either a-psychological or linguistic explanation of acquisition. The psychological explanation 
is that the negative marker "no" and, hence, the scope of the meaning of negation, are internal 
to the sentence and attached to the verb, consistent with the scope of negative meaning in the 
adult sentences children hear (Bloom, 1970). The challenge comes with sentences in which 
"no" appears before a sentence subject--examples from my early data included "no Mommy do 
it," "No, Kathryn playing self." According to linguistic theory, such sentences display the 
derivational history of the rules for generating sentences in adult grammar--rules that include 
an early, preliminary representation of "no" external to the abstract underlying structure of the 
sentence, before later movement rules that transport "no" into the sentence (e.g., Deprez & 
Pierce, 1993). Thus, the linguistic argument is that sentences with "no" before a subject occur 
in early child speech, because they correspond to an early rule in the derivation or generation 
of the underlying abstract structure of adult negative sentences. 
The original analysis I reported in 1970 was an interpretive one. I showed that sentences with 
"no" before the subject were actually affirmative, and that the proposition expressed in the 
sentence was not what was being negated. "No" was anaphoric, meaning that it referred back 
to negate something either said previously or something that was otherwise already explicit in 
the context. [For example, when Kathryn said "No, Kathryn playing self,-" she was asserting 
her intent to play with her own toys, and opposing the suggestion that she play with different 
toys--"no" in her sentence negated the prior suggestion, not the predicate "playing self."] 
Interpretive analyses reported in other research, since then, have revealed still other non-
negative meanings of negation-initial sentences, particularly in certain discourse contexts, and 
support my original contention that children do not pass through an early period in which they 
learn a primitive form of sentence external negation which then drops out (e.g., Keller-Cohen 
& Gracey, 1979 and, more recently, Drozd, 1996). Nevertheless, there are occasional--very 
occasional, it turns out--instances in which a child might indeed be doing what the linguists 
want them to be doing in order to show the correctness of an abstract linguistic analysis, and 
these are the examples seized on for their argument. So the issue continues to be debated. 
However, Karen Stromswold did the study I'd been hoping someone would do--she examined 
over 16,000 children's sentences with "no" or "not" in the Childes database and found very 
few instances in which children put the negative before sentence subjects for expressing a 
negative proposition in a truly negative sentence. The exceptions cited are not the rule, but 
truly exceptions--most likely the random result of production error. She concluded "there is 
not evidence that children go through an early stage during which negation appears to the left 
of subject noun phrases" (Stromswold, 1995, p.2). 
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Subjectless sentences and the form and function of negation in early syntax are but two of  the 
issues dividing researchers of language acquisition--they happen to be two that originated with 
my own early work. But they are good examples of the tensions between theories driven by 
the psychology of the child, on the one hand, and by linguistic theories of the adult grammar, 
on the other. Chomsky's "language acquisition device"--a reductive mechanism in a black box 
if ever there was one--has since been followed by a serious infatuation with the brain and 
efforts to explain the functions in the brain responsible for learning and language. However, 
even if we succeed, with the remarkable advances in brain imaging that are now available, in 
coming up with a convincing account of the causal connections between brain and behavior, 
such an account, however impressive, can no more explain how a child acquires language than 
can the implausible claim Pinker (1994) that language is reducible to a "gene." 
Language acquisition can never, in principle, be explained by mechanistic, reductionist 
theories of language and the brain or the genes, because language is created by a child in the 
dynamic contexts and circumstances that make up the child's world. Language is learned by a 
child who is not so much destined to acquire a language, by virtue of genes and brain hard-
wiring, as empowered to acquire language--for achieving a sense of causal agency and efficacy 
in the actions and interactions of daily living and becoming a member of society. Children 
acquire language 'for its expressive power--for the fundamental fact that language expresses 
and articulates the contents of mind. But language, by itself, is not special, is not separate 
from the other aspects of human functioning and development. In short, language is acquired 
by a child in a personal and physical context, not by a device in the brai!1;. 
The goal of the research I've done in the last 15 years, summarized in Bloom (1993) and our 
current research (Bloom et al, 1997), has been to put the child back into the study of language 
acquisition. The work has been guided by an explicitly psychological and developmental 
perspective on language acquisition, a perspective that begins with the affective, cognitive, and 
social life o f  a child, and asks: How is language acquired in the larger context o f  the child's 
life? From this perspective, a theory to explain language acquisition that fails to take into 
account the larger, developmental context in which language acquisition occurs is 
fundamentally incomplete. 
The Intentionality Model 
I have proposed that the core of development bringing an infant to the threshold of language at 
the end of the first year, and motivating and sustaining language acquisition in the succeeding 
years, is in the child's intentionality. Intentional states are contents of mind under 
psychological attitudes of belief, desire, and feeling, as described, for example, in the 
6 
philosophy of Danto (1973, 1983), Searle (1983), Taylor (1979, 1985), and before them, 
Brentano (1930/1966). They are dynamically constructed from moment-to-moment in that part 
of  the mind ordinarily referred to as consciousness, and they are crucial to acquiring all forms 
of  human behavior. Development, in general, depends on a process of  transaction between 
these internal representations in intentional states and the external social and physical world 
(Bloom & Beckwith, 1987).  
Thus, intentionality is what the contents of mind are about at any moment in time: 
representations of objects, roles, and relationships. It is a child's intentional states that 
language expresses and that result when children interpret the expressions of  others. 
Developments in affect, cognition, and social connectedness to other persons necessarily 
converge in the expression of  a child's intentionality, before language and as language is 
acquired (e.g., Bloom, 1993a; Bloom, 1997; Bloom et al, 1997). Affect and emotional 
development are required for motivating engagement and interest in other persons, objects, and 
events. Social development is required, because the motivation for learning a language comes 
from the need to connect with, and sustain intersubjectivity with, other persons. Cognitive 
development is required in order to construct the mental representations in intentional states that 
language expresses and that result from interpreting the expressions of  others. EXPRESSION 
IS BASIC. Language is learned because it expresses the contents of mind and articulates the 
elements, roles, and relations in intentional states--making them manifest so that other persons 
can know them. Thus, the driving force for language development comes from a child's strong 
impetus for expression and interpretation, in achieving a sense of agency, control, and efficacy, 
as children endeavor to create and negotiate the circumstances of their lives. 
In the intentionality model, languages are learned because children strive to maintain 
intersubjectivity with other persons--to share what they and others are feeling and thinking. In 
the first year of life, before language, this intersubjectivity depends on expressions of  affect 
between baby and caregiver. By the end of the first year, affect expression is well developed 
for sustaining intersubjectivity' but one-year-olds have also had a year of  learning about the 
world. Developments in cognition, social interaction, and emotional understanding in the first 
year of life contribute to the development of an intentional being--a person, with thoughts and 
feelings that include other persons and objects and events in the world. The result is the 
representation of mental meanings and emotions that require expression i f  they are to be 
shared with other persons, and language not only expresses, it also articulates the contents of  
intentional states in a way that the forms of affect expression cannot. Language, therefore, has 
to keep up with the developments of the first three years of life--the developments in 
cognition, emotionality, and social connectedness that press the child to acquire words and the 
sentence procedures for expression and interpretation. 
Language development, in particular, depends on the connections between world and mind, 
because words and sentences are connected to referents in a mind; words and sentences are not 
connected to things 'out there' in the world (Faconnier, 1985). Words mediate mind/world 
transactions: going from mind to world for expression--the words a child says articulate what 
the child has in mind, from world to mind for interpretation--the words a child hears change 
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what the child has in mind to set up new representations. This transaction process between
internal representations in intentional states and the external social and physical world is
governed by several generalizations I have called the principles ofrelevance, discrepancy, and
elaboration (Bloom, 1993a), and these principles are responsive to different aspects of a
child's development.
According to the principle of relevance, development is enhanced when events in the
context bear upon and are pertinent to what the child has in mind. The principle of
relevance is responsive in particular to a child's affective engagement, interest, and
emotional investment in the personal and physical world. The relevance of adult
behavior is assured, and behaviors are made accessible for learning, when adults tune
into what a child is feeling and thinking.
According to the principle of discreponcy, development is enhanced when the child acts
to resolve a mismntch between what the child has in mind and what is already evident
to others in the context. As infants remember past events and anticipate new events,
they have beliefs, desires, and feelings about things which other persons cannot yet
know. Children will have to acquire a language when what they have in mind needs to
be expressed if it is to be known and shared by others, who cannot exploit clues from
the context for understanding. Thus, the principle of discrepancy is responsive in
particular to a child's social development and need to sustain intersubjectivity and
social connectedness to other persons.
And according to the principle of elaboration, children will have to learn more words
and, eventually, procedures for sentences, if they are to express and aniculate the
increasingly elaborated contents of mind made possible by other developmets in
cognition and social and emotional understanding. The principle of elaboration is
responsive to a child's cognitive development--in particular, to developments in the '
symbolic capacity and conceptual structure that generate the flowbf representations f-,'..
that are the child's intentioiral states. +,.
The research I've done in the last 15 years has provided support for the principles of :
relevance, discrepancy, and elaboration in the intentionality model presented in Bloom 5
(1993a). I will
showed that the ffi
accumulating w d Y*
racial, ethnic, and religious backgrounds, whom we saw every month in our laboratory =-
playroom and in their homes, from 9 months toZ ll2 years. The children acquired increasing
numbers of words in the months between their lst and 2nd birthdays, as we expected they
would. But, more than that, and consistent with the principle of discrepancy, they were
learning more words to talk about things they anticipated-thngs that were immhent but not
yet evident to other persons in the situation. Their words later in the period, at the time of a
vocabulary spurt, were more likely to express anticipative meanings than meanings about
things already evident. And, in addition, consistent with the principle of elaboration, the
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children were also talking more about anticipated actions relative to state events--actions being














First Words Vocabulary Spurt
Language Achievement
Fig. 1. Children's intentional states about anticipated action
or state events attributed to speech during early word
learning: at First Words and the time of a Vocabulary Spurt
in the 2d year. Adapted from Bloom, Beckwith,
Capatides, and Hafitz (1988) and Bloom (1993a).
Our recent research since has now brought together several aspects of development and
sxamined how emotional, social, and other cognitive behaviors interacted with the children,s
words in the process of acquisition in the 2nd year @loom, Tinker, & Beckwith , lggT). I will
show the results of a set of analyses, at a single point in time: th-e month in which each of the
chiftlien r-e4ched a vocabulary spurt.in the 2pd year. Their mean age in these sessions was
about 19 mohths, and thEy ranged in age from 13 to 21 months. The children were equated,
.therefore, for level of language acquisition rather than for chronological age for these
analyses.
lllluonrto. fo6-(rl
Timecode signal from audio tract I ?
Computer to romote @ntrol jsct t
Coding station
Fig.2. Coding Station for transcribing speech and coding
emotional expression and play, showing the video deck
interfaced with a microprocessor via a time stamp reader.
Adapted from Beckwith et al (1985) and Bloom (1993b).
We interfaced the video deck with a microprocessor via a time starnp reader for coding and
transcribing a number of different behaviors in the data @echrith et al, 1985; Bloom, 1993b).
We then devised procedures for a form of lag sequential analysis to look at the timing of
different behaviors as they occurred together in real time, in the course of everyday events. In
our most recetrt studies, we've exaniined 4 behaviors in particular: child object play (as our
window otr cognition), and three kinds of expression: child speech, child emotional
expression, mother speech (as a window on the social context). After establishing the baseline
rates of each of the expressive behaviors, for each child and mother, we then looked at the
tendency for one kind of behavior, the lagged behavior, to occur relative to its baseline level
of occurrence in the context of a different, target behavior: during the target interval and in the
l-sec intervals before and after the target.
The null hypothesis is shown in Figure 3: If one kind of behavior occurs independently of
another kind of behavior, then the lagged behavior should not differ from its baseline rate
relative to the target behavior. The horizontal line in Figure 3 represents the baseline rate of
the lagged behavior as it occurred in a child's actions and interactions throughout the session.
The vertical line represents the time interval, from the onset of the target behavior to its offset.
In this hypothetical instanc€, there is no systematic relationship between the two behaviors:
The behavior that is lagged around the interval of the target child behavior does not differ
from its baseline rate of occunence in the entire sample overall.
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Ocurrence of One Kind of Behavior
in l-sec Intervals Around




Fig. 3. The Null Hypothesis of Independence: One kind of
behavior will not deviate from its baseline rate of
occurrence before, during, and after another, different kind
of behavior, if the nvo kinds of behavior are independent of
each other. Adapted from Bloom, Tinker, and Beckwith
(unpublished manuscript).
If, however, different behaviors occurring within the same window of timf are, indeed,
expressions of the same underlying intentional states, then the one behavior that is lagged
around the other could be expected to deviate from its baseline in a systematic way. We tested
a series of such hypotheses relative to the direction and degree of the deviation from baseline
of one behavior relative to another, and the results are presented in the figures that follow.
[Note: The results shown in these figures have been simplified here for ease of presentation.
Deviations from baseline were measured in standard deviation units. The statistical reliability
of deviation from baseline wa.s tested using repeated measures analyses of variance, with time
from l-sec before through 2-secs after a target behaviorl as the within subject variable and
expression [child emotion, child speech, mother speech] as the between subjects variable when
more than one behavior was lagged around the same target. Only results significant at the .05
level of confidence or less are shown here. See Bloom, Margulis, Tinker, & Fujita, 1996,
for description of these procedures, and Bloom, Tinker, & Beclovith, 1997 for .the full results
that are represented by the figures presented here).
Observed
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In the original analysis (Bloom & Beckwith, 1989), we tested the hypothesis that children's
emotional expression-positive and negative affective tone--would not deviate systematically
from baseline if child emotional expression and speech were independent of each other. The
results are schematizd in Figure 4. The children's emotional expression and speech were
closely associated in time, with a peak in emotional expression relative to baseline rates of
emotional expression overall immediately after the child said something.
Tendency to Express Emotion
During Speech and




Fig. 4. Expression of emotion before, during, and after
children's speech relative to the baseline rate of expression
of emotion overall. Adapted from Bloom and Beckwith
(1989) and Bloom (1993a).
We interpreted these results to mean that, in general, children are learning to talk about those
things that are relevanl to them. But this analysis did not take into account anything else that
was happening or going on at the same time. The next analysis, therefore, looked at the
relationship in real time between children's expressing emotiou and playing with objects-in
particular, when they constructed thematic relationships between objects, like putting a bead
on a string or a doll in a car.
Emotional expression was suppressed when children were engaged in constructing activities
with the objects in play. We concluded therefore, that children express neutral (non-
emotionel) affect to conserve affeaive and cognitive resources for the attention and thinking
that constructing thematic relatious requires. We then examined the relationship between child








Tendency to Express Emotion
During Object Play and




Fig. 5. Expression of emotion before, during, and after
children's play with objects (constmcting activities) relative
to the baseline rate of expression of emotion overall.
Adapted from Bloom, Tinker, and Beckwith (unpublished
manuscript).
Tendency for Child Speech and Emotion
to Occur During Object Play and




Fig. 6. Children's qpeech and expression of emotion
before, during, and after play with objects (constructing
activities) relative to the respective baseline rates of child
speech and emotional expression overall. Adapted from
Bloom, Tinker, and Beckwith (unpublished manuscript).
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Child speech was also suppressed around object play. Even though speech and emotional
expression were, in general, closely related in time (Figure 4), there was a ntrade-off' between
the two forrns of expression when children were engaged in the construction activities: The
children were more likely to talk about what they are doing than to express emotion. Relative
to their respective baselines, emotional expression decreased when child speech increased.
This result supported our earlier conclusion that children need to conserve resour@s during
object play. Finally, we added mothers' speech to the analysis, to see what the children's
mothers were doing in these intervals, and how mothers' speech interacted with child speech,
child emotion, and object play.
Mothers' Speech, Child Speech, and Child Emotion
During Object Play and




Fig. 7. Mothers' speech, child speech, and child emotional
expression before, during, and after play with objecs
(constructing activities) relative to the respective baseline
rates of mother speech, child speech, and child emotional
expression overall. Adapted from Bloom, Tinker, and
Beckwith (unpublished manuscript).
Mothers were most likely to talk after a child's object play, and least likely to be talking
during the interval of play, relative to their baseline rates of talking overan. MStniirs' speech
was also most likely to occur after child speech, and least likely to occur at the same time
(consistent with the result reported for their conversations generally by Bloom, Tinker, &
Margulis (1996). Thus, the mothers were primarily resporuive to both their children's play
and speech, letting the child take the lead. However, mother speech and child emotional
expression were synchronized with each other, showing the same pattern over time.
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Clearly, children's behaviors and the behaviors their mothers direct to them are not 
independent of each other. The results of these studies validate the major assumption of the 
classic 'developmental point of view' attributed to Heinz Werner: "Every behavioral act, 
whether outward bodily movement or internalized cognitive operation, gains its significance 
and status in terms of its role in the overall functioning of the organism" (Werner & Kaplan, 
1963, pp. 4-5). Paradoxically, while'the 'developmental point of view' has been largely taken 
for granted and tacitly assumed, it is nevertheless ignored by much of mainstream psychology. 
Instead, research and theory have become increasingly fragmented into separate domains of 
inquiry (see Glick, 1994). As a result of emphasizing only one or another aspect of 
development in efforts to explain it, language, cognition, emotion, and socialization have come 
to be categorized as domains or modules of human functioning, as reflected in the titles of our 
scholarly organizations and publications. But these behavioral functions are mutual influences 
and depend on each other in development--they are not discrete categories for the young child. 
Just as developments in other aspects of cognition or emotion or social interaction do not 
happen apart from each other or apart from language, acquiring language does not happen 
apart from them. 
Conclusions 
This talk began with a description of the contrast between two different perspectives on 
language acquisition research--one, the perspective from linguistics theory, which claims that 
language is special and attributable to a language acquisition device. The other, the 
psychological perspective, in which language is not separate from the rest of development and 
is acquired by a child in a social and physical context. I've concluded by showing that 
language does not occur independently of other behaviors--any more than other actions or 
emotional expression happen apart from language--in the course of everyday events. 
Language development, tlierefore, cannot be separate from the larger developmental context in 
which it occurs--affective, social, cognitive, and linguistic processes influence each other for a 
child's actions and interactions in the world. The three principles of my intentionality model--
the principles of relevance, discrepancy, and elaboration--are responsive to these different 
aspects of development. Affect promotes engagement with the physical and personal world and 
determines the relevance of what is worth learning. Social developments press the child to 
learn a language in order to share contents of mind that are discrepant from what is already 
available to other persons in the context. Developing cognition yields the symbolic capacity 
and conceptual structure in the knowledge base for the increasingly elaborated representation$ . 
in consciousness that language expresses, arid that result from interpreting the expressions of 
others. 
The influences on language development, as on all of development, originate in the child's 
intentionality--originate with the representations in intentional states that are constantly 
changing: changing in immediate time, as a function of the child's actions and interactions, 
and changing over extended time, as a function of development. Language influences the 
process as much as it is influenced by it, and all aspects of development come together in its 
acquisition. In contrast, when we put all the effort of explanation into only the words and 
linguistic structures of the adult language the child needs to learn, the result is a loss of 
perspective on the psychology o f  the child. It is also a loss of perspective on the language 
itself and the power of expression it provides. 
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